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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF LATIN AMERICA
Miguel Schor1
I. Introduction
The internal effects of a mutable policy are . . . calamitous.  It poisons the 
blessings of liberty itself.  It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are 
made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot 
be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or 
revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no 
man who knows what the law is to-day can guess what it will be tomorrow.2
The United States and the nations of Latin America became independent in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Independence movements throughout the 
Americas were motivated by similar ideological currents and, as a consequence, 
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2constitutions were framed throughout the Americas to cement the victory of liberalism.3
Although constitutions throughout the Americas were designed to institute republican 
government, the United States clearly enjoyed a different political outcome than did the 
nations of Latin America.  This Article explores a deceptively simple question which is 
why the founding of the constitution led to republican government in the United States
whereas the founding of constitutions led to oligarchy and dictatorship in Latin America 
for much of that region’s history.
The answer to this question lies in the historical processes by which constitutions 
become entrenched so that they gain the political support they need to withstand the 
buffeting of politics.  The issue of how constitutions become entrenched is of grave 
contemporary relevance as Latin America is undergoing profound transformations that 
were touched off by the crumbling of authoritarian regimes throughout the region in the 
waning decades of the twentieth century.4  Although polities democratized, there are deep 
concerns about the quality of democratic governance throughout the region.5  Presidents 
3
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3are elected but often act and look much like the dictators or caudillos of the nineteenth 
century.6  Elections are thriving but power is not curtailed by constitutions.  The 
seriousness of the failure to entrench constitutional rules cannot be underestimated.  The 
legitimacy of a democracy rests on majority rule and on an agreed upon set of ground 
rules that limit the power of elected leaders.  If democracies fail to institutionalize the 
fundamental rules of the game, support for democracy will erode.7
A commitment to the fundamental rules of the game in Latin America has clearly 
not been institutionalized.  Constitutional law in Latin America, which formally is 
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4intended to limit political power,8 behaves very differently than it does in the United 
States because of the remarkable ease with which constitutional provisions can be 
ignored or changed.9  Elections have become the route to power but they do not guarantee 
stability as a number of elected presidents have been ousted from power before their 
terms expired.10  Once in office, Presidents find that constitutions provide little in the way 
of checks and balances.  It took Ernesto Zedillo, the former president of Mexico, one 
month to amend the constitution so as to fundamentally transform the manner in which 
the Mexican Supreme Court exercised constitutional judicial review.11  President Hugo 
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5Chávez swore in his oath of office in 1998 that he would do away with Venezuela’s 
existing constitution.12  He cemented his power by using a constitutional convention to 
promulgate a new constitution in 1999.13  Former president Fujimori of Peru mounted a 
popular coup against his own government by claiming, in part, that the judiciary was 
corrupt and fired three justices who voted to uphold a constitutional prohibition against 
running for a third term.14  Former president Menem of Argentina stacked the Supreme 
Court with his cronies who stoutly defended Menem’s decree power to legislate as he 
wished without obtaining Congressional approval.15 President Lucio Gutiérrez of 
Ecuador was forced out of office because of widespread popular unrest caused, in part, by 
his decision to sack a Supreme Court that sided with his political opponents.16 The ease 
with which constitutions can be changed or ignored is facilitated by the widespread 
mistrust of the judiciary that exists in Latin America.17
Latin America’s experience with constitutions illustrates that democracy comes in 
more than one flavor.  At one end of the spectrum are consolidated or liberal democracies 
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6that have both vertical and horizontal accountability.18  Consolidated democracies have
elections that provide vertical accountability and laws and constitutions that provide the 
mechanisms used by a complex web of actors to ensure horizontal accountability.19
Elected leaders do not know ex ante what the outcome of any political dispute will be 
because disputes are mediated by relatively fixed rules.20  At the other end of the 
spectrum lie illiberal democracies where leaders are elected but constitutions fail to limit 
power.  Elected leaders know ex ante the outcome of a dispute because the rules can be 
ignored or changed in the middle of a dispute.
18 LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 
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(1996), Peter H. Smith, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy in Latin America, 
http://www.clas.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/fall2004/10-18-04-smith, and FAREED 
ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 
(2003).
19 DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA (Scott Mainwaring & 
Christopher Welna eds., 2003) and THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999).
20 ADAM PRZEWORKSI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10-50 (1991).  It is rare 
for political leaders to seek to change the rules to dictate the outcome of a dispute in a 
consolidated democracy.  The extraordinary political attention paid to Congress’s attempt 
to intervene in a fully litigated state judicial decision to remove feeding tubes from Terri 
Schiavo illustrates, among other things, how unusual such political machinations are.  
David K. Kirpatrick, How Family’s Cause Reached the Halls of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2005, at __ .  The federal judges who dealt with the unusual jurisdictional statute 
in question frustrated the intent of Congress by refusing to deal with the merits of the 
state court decision because they understood that the integrity of the rules that underpin 
the democratic process was at stake.  Adam Liptak, Schiavo Lesson on Judiciary Trump 
Card, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at __ and Abby Goodnough & William Yardley, 
Federal Judge Condemns Intervention in Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 
A13 (“A federal appeals court in Atlanta refused Wednesday to reconsider the case of 
Terri Schiavo, with one of the judges rebuking President Bush and Congress for acting 
‘in a manner demonstrably at odds with our founding fathers' blueprint for the 
governance of a free people.’”)
7The issue that this Article explores is how “governments of laws and not of men” 
might emerge in Latin America.21  Democracies are consolidated when they become the 
“only game in town” and dictatorship becomes unthinkable.22  What is needed is an 
attitudinal shift so that the citizens and elites become wedded to the rules of the political 
game.23  The “decisive step” in democratic consolidation occurs when there is 
“devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules.”24  For democracy to work, 
citizens have to be willing to support the constitution against inroads by elected leaders.  
The recent transitions to democracy that have occurred in Latin America,25 however, 
demonstrate that citizen support for elections does not necessarily translate into support 
for constitutional limits to power.  Horizontal accountability does not emerge at the same 
time as does vertical accountability.  A constituency for a constitution is more difficult to 
construct than is a constituency for electing leaders.
The process by which horizontal accountability emerges so that constitutions 
become not only formally but also behaviorally entrenched against the shifting sands of 
21 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
22 DIAMOND, supra note 16, at 65.
23 Id. at 64-73.
24 PRZEWORKSI, supra note 18, at 14.
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8politics is not well understood.26  Constitutional law in Latin America has an almost 
surreal quality given that constitutions do not provide accurate maps to how power is 
distributed.27  All legal orders have a gap between the law on the books and the law as 
practiced28 but this gap is broader in Latin American than in the United States.29  In Karst
and Rosenn’s pioneering Law and Development in Latin America: a Case Book, the 
authors suggest that the enormity of the gap is captured by the Spanish and Portuguese 
maxim: “For our friends, everything; for strangers, nothing; and for enemies, the law!”30
The anthropologist Roberto Da Matta argues that hierarchical social relations provide a 
more accurate map to power in Brazil than does the law.31 Rather than the rule of law, 
26
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9Latin America is said to suffer from the “(un)rule of law.”32 Given the magical nature of 
the formal constitutional rules in Latin America, this Article will peer through the looking 
glass of constitutionalism in Latin America to explore the process by which constitutions 
become entrenched against political inroads by examining three, interrelated puzzles.  
The first, which is discussed in Part II infra, concerns why the American 
constitution limits political power.  To understand why horizontal accountability has not
emerged in Latin America, we first need to understand why the American constitution 
limits political power.  There are two competing answers to this question.  The 
conventional account of constitutionalism posits that constitutions can become 
entrenched only if they operate as a species of law.33 That is, only if constitutional law 
rests on some form of “neutral principles” will it be respected by other actors.34 The 
problem with the conventional account is that it confuses the end of a long historical 
process with the process itself.  The constitution is not legitimate because the Supreme 
Court now enjoys the authority to issue orders that other political actors generally accept 
but because the constitution gained broad societal acceptance in a contingent, historical 
process.35
32 THE (UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (Juan E. 
Méndez et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE (UN)RULE OF LAW]. 
33 See Part II(A) infra.  
34
 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 9 (1959).
35 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO 
POLITICS 5-14 (1996) and TEITEL, supra note __, at 207 (noting that the process by which 
the American constitution was made is more piecemeal and less foundational than the 
leading accounts suggest). 
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The other principal account of American constitutionalism is a realist one.36  It 
posits that the secret of the success of the American constitution lies not in a shared 
understanding that constitutional law must be kept distinct from politics by having the 
former rest on non-political, neutral principles, as the conventional account argues, but 
rather in a shared understanding that constitutional politics is played under different rules 
than ordinary politics.  American constitutionalism rests on a broad societal 
understanding that changing the constitution requires a greater degree of debate and 
citizen mobilization than is required for changing ordinary statutes.  By bringing we the 
people back into the story of the constitution, the realist account rightly focuses attention 
on how constitutions are socially constructed over time.  The constitutional enterprise is, 
as John Finn notes, an “effort to create a particular type of community, a constitutional 
democracy, that can survive the corrupting influences of time and fortune.”37
The second puzzle, which is discussed in Part III infra, explores why polities with 
similar constitutions sometimes enjoy very different governments.  The newly 
independent nations of Latin America adopted constitutions that formally looked like that 
of the United States yet the result was oligarchy and dictatorship, not democracy.  The 
scholarly consensus is that constitutions operated differently in Latin America than in the 
United States because they were planted on a social soil that was inimical to 
democracy.38 Laws are not, however, merely a reflection of the larger social, economic, 
36 See Part II(B) infra .  
37
 John Finn, The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 41, 42
(Barber A. Sotirios & Robert P. George eds., 2001) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS]. 
38 See Part III(A) infra.
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political, and cultural environment in which they are embedded.39 The gap between 
written constitutions and political reality in the region is not simply a result of the 
differing conditions that existed between Latin American and the United States at the 
time of independence40 but is also a result of how constitutions were socially 
constructed.41  The elites or framers who shaped Latin America’s constitutions believed 
that economic development had to occur before the masses could be allowed to 
participate in democracy.  As a consequence, these elites opted for malleable 
constitutions.  This enhanced elite power as rulers knew in advance the results of any 
political outcome but at the expense of the attitudinal shift needed for democracy to be 
consolidated as there was little reason for citizens to become wedded to rules that could 
be readily changed at the behest of their rulers.  Constitutions are not entrenched in Latin 
America because political leaders do not fear citizen mobilization when the fundamental 
rules of the game are violated.  
The third puzzle, which is discussed in Part IV infra, is why it has proven so 
difficult to entrench constitutions in Latin America.  The formal rules of the game had to 
be malleable if elites were to retain power but the consequences are, as Madison 
surmised, “calamitous.”42  Every change in political leadership is a potential 
constitutional crisis if the selection of new leaders means that the fundamental rules of 
39 BRIAN Z. TAMANHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 209 
(2001)(concluding that the view that law is a mirror of society has prevented “us from 
seeing the many other things that law . . . does and is used to do.”)
40
 For a brief overview of the salient differences, see Rosenn, supra note __.  
These differences are not, however, as great as is often imagined.  See LANGLEY, supra
note __.
41 See Part III(B) infra.  See also TEITEL, supra note __ (arguing that during 
transitional periods law can play an important role in constituting society).
42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 2.  
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the game might be changed with the adoption of a new constitution.43 The sheer number 
of constitutions adopted in Latin America stands mute testimony to the regularity of 
irregular accession to power by presidents and dictators.  The logic of this constitutional 
cycle can only be broken if power is devolved from elites to rules.  This in turn can occur 
only if constitutional politics become separated from ordinary politics. Societies gain the 
understanding that constitutions should be difficult to change when broad social 
movements arise that seek to effectuate rights.44 The experience of the United States 
teaches us that rights become entrenched when they gain a constituency.  The experience 
of Latin America, on the other hand, teaches us that without deep social moorings, 
constitutions can neither limit power nor withstand the test of time.
43 See Part IV(A) infra.  
44 See Part IV(B) infra.
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II. Constitutionalism in the United States
There is almost no political question in the United States that is not resolved 
sooner or later into a judicial question.  Hence the obligation under which the 
parties find themselves in their daily polemics to borrow from the ideas and 
language of justice. . . . Judicial language thus becomes in a way the vulgar 
language; the spirit of the lawyers, born inside the schools and the courts, 
therefore spreads little by little beyond their precincts; it so to speak infiltrates all 
society, it descends into the lowest ranks, and the people as a whole in the end 
contract a part of the habits and the tastes of the magistrates.45
The rise of democracy throughout the world had a profound impact on legal 
scholarship as comparative constitutionalism has become an important area of research.46
Perhaps more importantly it may help move constitutional theory away from a somewhat 
parochial focus on the normative limits of judicial review to more fertile issues such as 
exploring the role that constitutions play in maintaining democracy.47 Throughout the 
world, new democracies have sought to strengthen national high courts in a bid to 
entrench constitutions48 but it is not clear whether or how those constitutions will garner 
the political support they need to limit power successfully.  De Tocqueville’s observation 
concerning the attitudinal shift by the citizenry that was a necessary prerequisite for 
successful constitutionalism in the United States has become a pressing research issue 
given that it has proven easier to elect leaders than to make constitutions work.  
45 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 257-8 (Harvey C. 
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop trans., 2000) (1835).
46
 The advent of two casebooks and a major journal devoted to the subject 
illustrates the attention the subject is getting: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet  eds., 1999); COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (Norman Dorsen et al. eds., 2003); and INT’L J. OF CONST L.
47
 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dimensions of Democracy, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1723, 1747 (2003) (arguing that constitutional theory should “restore the dimensions of 
democracy that have for so long been absent from American constitutional scholarship” 
because of the issues raised by the worldwide expansion of democracy).
48 THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (Neal C. Tate & Torbjorn 
Vallinder eds., 1995).
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The United States has had a successful democracy for over two centuries, 
moreover, so it makes sense to search for an answer to this question in the American 
experience.  American constitutionalism is, as Professor Griffin argues, a “distinctive 
political practice that deserves closer study than it has so far received.”49 There are two 
competing accounts of what makes the American constitution work.50 One account 
posits that constitutions have the legitimacy they need to cabin political power only if 
they operate as a species of law and that constitutionalism, therefore, rests on a shared 
understanding that politics is distinct from law.  This view comports with our 
conventional understanding of the role of the constitution in American democracy and is 
discussed in Part II(A) infra. The weakness of the conventional account is that it assumes 
that courts are able to play the key role in maintaining constitutional limits on political 
power because citizens believe that the constitution should be treated as law.  The notion 
of American exceptionalism51—that the constitution works because the United States is a 
liberal society with shared values—is deeply ingrained but it does not provide an accurate 
picture of the political practices that sustain American constitutionalism.  The reality of 
American politics is that citizens do not act as if constitutional maintenance should be the 
sole domain of courts52 and are very much engaged in constitutional discourse.53 The rise 
49 GRIFFIN, supra note __ at x.
50
 Finn, supra note __ .  Professor Finn argues that one account emphasizes that 
the constitution is law whereas the other principal account emphasizes the role that a 
constitution plays in constituting a nation.  Finn’s analysis differs from that used in this 
Article, however, since his point of departure is how scholars view the constitution rather 
than the political practices that make constitutionalism possible. 
51 LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
52 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).  
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of democracy through the world, moreover, casts doubt on any claim that American 
constitutional democracy is exceptional. The realist account of constitutionalism, which 
is discussed in Part II(B) infra, provides a very different and better analysis of the 
political practices that underpin American constitutionalism because it moves courts 
away from the center of the constitutional universe by bringing we the people back into 
the story of American constitutionalism.  It also does a better job of explaining how 
different polities and cultures may enjoy constitutional democracy because the focus is on 
the political practices that sustain constitutionalism rather than the law of the 
Constitution.  While the institutions of American government are not readily transported 
across cultural boundaries as the constitutional experience of Latin America 
demonstrates,54 the mechanisms by which citizens become wedded to constitutions are 
universal.
A. The conventional account of constitutionalism
The conventional account of constitutionalism rests on two heroic assumptions: 
(1) the successful founding of the constitution was due to the propitious circumstances of 
American history and (2) the constitution was the legal engine that maintained American 
democracy over time.  The former rests on a triumphalist view of American history 
which is that the United States enjoyed an equality of social conditions that made 
possible a democratic revolution that led to the promulgation of the constitution.  The 
latter posits that key to the success of American democracy in enduring for over two 
53 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE xi (1986) (documenting the “perceptions and 
misperceptions” as well as the “knowledge and ignorance of ordinary Americans” 
regarding the Constitution).  
54 See Part III infra .  
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centuries is the legitimacy of the constitution which in turn rests on maintaining a wall 
between law and politics.  The key actor in this republican drama is the judiciary.  
Constitutions safeguard democracy by creating a system of checks and balances that are 
maintained over time by courts.  Courts play the key role in maintaining constitutions 
whereas the task of transforming constitutions via amendments is political in nature.  
Amendments are the tool used to change these foundational documents to accommodate 
their strictures to evolving social, political, and economic conditions.  The conventional 
account, in short, emphasizes a sharp break between law and politics and provides courts, 
principally the Supreme Court, with the principal role in maintaining the vigor of the
constitution over time.
Richard S. Kay in American Constitutionalism55 provides a fine exposition of the 
conventional understanding of constitutionalism.  He defines constitutionalism as the 
“’trust . . . men repose in the power of words engrossed on parchment to keep 
government in order.’”56  This trust flows from a particularly American innovation when 
it came to constitutionalism which was to fix the fundamental rules used to limit the 
power of government by putting those rules in writing.57  That is to say, constitutions are 
55
 Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16 (1998).  
56 Id. (quoting Walton H. Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 255 (Edwin R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1931)).
57 Id. at 27.  A written constitution is clearly not a sine qua non of successful 
constitutionalism as England has managed to limit political power without one.  Giovanni 
Sartori, Constitutionalism: a Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1961).
Written constitutions differ from unwritten one, however, in that written constitutions 
open the door to originalist interpretations which obviously make little sense with 
unwritten constitutions.  ERIC BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
26-34 (1998)(arguing that the United Kingdom has a common law constitution that has 
evolved over time).  
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able maintain order because they are promulgated based on a “widely shared political 
consensus as to the nature of the constituent authority in a polity,”58 and are interpreted in 
accordance with written rules.  The key to keeping these rules fixed is to create an 
agency, namely the Supreme Court, which lacks political motivation and will interpret 
these rules, therefore, according to the “original intent of the constitutional enactors.”59
In short, the success of American democracy in enduring for two centuries rests on the 
legitimacy of the constitution which, in turn, can only be maintained by a Supreme Court 
that observes interpretational niceties.60
Although the conventional account of constitutionalism emphasizes the role of the 
Supreme Court in explaining the success of American constitutionalism to the exclusion 
of almost all other factors, the conventional account also provides us with an idea of the 
sort of soil on which constitutions must be planted if they are to be successfully 
implemented.  What is required is a society that is relatively egalitarian and enjoys a fair 
amount of ideological consensus.61  Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America,62 for 
58 Id. at 30.
59 Id. at 31.  
60
 Although the conventional account of constitutionalism clearly borrows from 
originalist interpretations of the constitution, the two are not the same.  Originalism is a 
theory of how courts should interpret the constitution in a democracy.  The argument is 
that courts must be originalist to maintain legitimacy.  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) and Antonin Scalia, 
Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: the Role of United States Federal Courts in 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (1997).  The conventional account of constitutionalism has a 
deeper and broader target as it seeks to uncover the role that constitutions play in 
maintaining democracy over time.  The legitimacy of the constitution is not the same as 
the legitimacy of the courts that interpret it.
61
 A similar argument is often advanced to explain why Costa Rica has been Latin 
America’s most successful democracy.  See JOHN A. BOOTH, COSTA RICA: QUEST FOR 
DEMOCRACY (1998).
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example, argues that the remarkable success of the Constitution and the subsequent 
power of the Supreme Court rest on the fact that the United States lacks a feudal past.63
As a result, the American revolution was far gentler than in other parts of the world such 
as Europe or Latin America that experienced feudalism.64 The revolutionary wave that 
swept the North Atlantic world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
sought to usher in profound transformations.  The difficulties that these transformations
entailed cannot be underestimated as they required deep and profound political, 
economic, and social changes.  The goals of these transformations were to replace 
monarchy with republican government , mercantilism with capitalism, and an 
inegalitarian, hierarchical social structure with egalitarianism.  Hartz argues that
American revolution was successful because the colonies did not need to undergo these 
transformations.  The United States was exceptional because liberalism lacked any 
challengers.  The constitution worked because there were no fundamental struggles over 
values in the United States:
For the solution that the constitutionalists offered to the frightful conflicts they 
imagined was a complicated scheme of checks and balances which it is reasonable 
to argue only a highly united nation could make work at all.  Delay and deliberate 
confusion in government became intolerable in communities were men have 
decisive social programs that they want to execute.”65
In short, American revolutionaries inherited a liberal society which explains the success 
of the constitution.
62 HARTZ, supra note __.
63 Id. at 9.
64
 Latin America quite obviously lacked a feudal nobility which has led some 
scholars to argue that it lacks true feudalism.  See, e.g., CLAUDIO VÉLIZ, THE CENTRALIST 
TRADITION OF LATIN AMERICA (1980).  Although Latin American lacked the formal legal 
structures of feudalism, there is no doubt that behaviorally it exhibited the key features of 
a feudal society.  See IRVING A. LEONARD, BAROQUE TIMES IN OLD MEXICO (1959).
65 Id. at 85.
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The importance given the Supreme Court in maintaining the constitution by the 
conventional account of constitutionalism leads to a concrete set of policy prescriptions 
for the newly democratized nations of the world.  If they wish to enjoy constitutional 
success, these nations must adopt the “best practices” of consolidated democracies, such 
as the United States. 66  These new democracies must seek to implement written 
constitutions by establishing and strengthening supreme or constitutional courts.  The key 
to implementing constitutions is to have supreme courts with the independence to enforce 
constitutional guarantees without regard to political pressure to the contrary.67 The 
power of the conventional account in our understanding of constitutionalism is illustrated 
by the extensive literature on judicial independence that has been written in the wake of 
the third wave of democratization.68
When it comes to providing advice for the new democracies of the world, the 
conventional account suffers from a latent but profound contradiction.  These nations 
should adopt written constitutions and strengthen independent supreme courts yet these 
66 YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE 
WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN 
STATES (2002) and Miguel Schor, The Rule of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (David Clark ed., 2005).
67
 Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM 
AROUND THE WORLD 13-21 (Peter H. Russell & David O’Brien eds., 2001).
68
 John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999); JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE 
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen Burbank & Barry Friedman 
eds., 2002); JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note __; 
Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and 
Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 605 (1996); Mark J. Ramseyer, The Puzzling 
(In)dependence of Courts: a Comparative Approach, 23 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); 
and JENNIFER WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD 
TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA (2001).
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institutions cannot work well when transplanted to societies that look markedly different 
than the United States.69  The conventional account of constitutionalism rests on the 
notion of American exceptionalism, which, if correct, presents a fairly dim future for the 
new democracies of the world.  Formal legal structures such as written constitutions and 
supreme courts that enjoy nominal independence are easy to transplant but what gives 
constitutional law its efficacy is a legal and political culture that cannot be transplanted.  
De Tocqueville’s observation that in the United States political issues eventually become 
judicial questions presupposes, of course, that citizens are willing to accept the rule of 
law.  Hartz makes this point when he concludes that the United States has little to offer 
the world when it comes to lessons about democracy by saying “Can a people born equal 
ever understand others, can it ever understand itself.”70  The problem with the 
conventional account is that it does not tell us how constitutions may be implemented in 
other nations other than to wait for the mysterious process by which a people become 
acculturated to the rule of law.
B. The realist account of constitutionalism
The third wave of democratization not only remade the political map of the world, 
but it also led to very different questions being asked about our own constitution.  The 
conventional account of constitutionalism is moored in a world where American 
exceptionalism is taken for granted.  As a result, it conflates constitutional law with 
69
 Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun, Introduction: political culture and 
constitutionalism, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 1, 2 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., 1995)(arguing that 
constitutions do not work well if they are alien to a political and legal culture but rather 
must evolve over time as a national identity is created).
70 THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 308.  
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constitutionalism and focuses on how the constitution should be interpreted rather than 
the role it plays in building a nation.71  A realist account, on the other hand, seeks to 
provide an account of the American constitution that makes sense in a world which is 
populated with a number of nations that are seeking to build constitutional democracies.  
The starting point of any such a theory is Karl Llewellyn’s observation that a constitution 
is not just a set of rules but a “somewhat peculiar” institution, because “it involves . . . 
[the ways of living and doing] of a huge number of people—well-nigh the whole 
population.”72 A core argument of this Article is that any adequate theory of 
constitutionalism should turn not on normative theories of how the constitution should be 
interpreted but rather the pragmatic and empirical question73 of what are the social 
practices that enable constitutions to limit political power.  
Although how constitutions become entrenched is clearly the central question for 
constitutionalism in Latin America and in the developing world, the animating issue for 
realist accounts of American constitutionalism has been a somewhat different question 
which is what are the political or democratic practices that sustain the founding, 
71
 A fine example of how conventional accounts of constitutionalism place the 
constitutional carriage before the democratic horse is Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer’s Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2002).  
They argue that maintaining the supremacy of the Supreme Court is essential if the 
constitution is to facilitate democratic stability and social co-operation.  The difficulty 
that the democracies of the third wave have had in entrenching constitutions, however, 
demonstrates that societal acceptance of constitutions and supreme courts must be 
constructed and maintained before and if these institutions are to operate in a satisfactory 
manner.
72
 Llewellyn, supra note __ , at 18.  See also GRIFFIN, supra note __, at x (arguing 
that constitutionalism is a “distinctive political practice” that deserves close study).
73
 Constitutionalism, therefore, differs from constitutional theory which is more 
normative in focus.  Richard H. Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. 
L. REV. 537, 540 (1999) and David Strauss, What is Constitutional Theory?, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 581, 587-88 (1999).  
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transformation, and maintenance of constitutions.74 Bruce Ackerman’s We the People75
is a seminal, realist account of constitutionalism that breaks with the conventional 
account of constitutionalism in two respects.  First, he provides an empirically grounded 
account of how the American constitution was founded and transformed.  He argues that 
the conventional account of constitutionalism that distinguishes the revolutionary 
underpinnings of the constitution from the legal transformations that it underwent
subsequent to the founding does not comport with our historical experience.  
Constitutions are made and changed as a result of “constitutional politics”76 or political 
movements.  Second, he turns the focus from the role of the Supreme Court in 
maintaining the constitution to the societal understandings that undergird the constitution.  
What made the American constitution possible is not that the citizens believed that law 
was distinct from politics with the former resting on neutral, apolitical principles and the 
latter resting on the aggregation of votes but that they understood that constitutional 
politics was to be played according to a different set of rules than ordinary politics.  A 
74
 John Ferejohn et al., Editor’s Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND 
DEMOCRATIC RULE 1 (Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE] 
and GRIFFIN, supra note __.  The obvious reason that American constitutionalism has not 
dealt with the issue of entrenchment is that we expect political actors to respect the 
constitution.  There are examples, however, of constitutional provisions that proved so 
politically unpalatable that they were not enforced.  The civil rights amendments, for 
example, were used to protect the “liberty” of business interests but were dead letter law 
insofar as the equality of the recently freed slaves until the civil rights movement of the 
1960s.  Perhaps more common than the non-enforcement of constitutional norms is their 
underenforcement for prudential reasons.  See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: the 
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
75 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) and WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
76 FOUNDATIONS, supra note __, at 7.
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higher degree of mobilization and consensus is required to make and change constitutions 
than ordinary law.  
Ackerman’s conclusion as to the importance of constitutional politics rests on 
important commonalities between three key constitutional moments: the founding  of the 
constitution, the civil war amendments, and the Supreme Court’s rejection of a role in 
meaningfully reviewing economic legislation in the wake of the New Deal.  The 
conventional view is that the first is the result of the revolution, the second the result of 
the amendment process, and the last is part of the normal pull and tug of interpretation as 
the Court adopted an earlier and correct view of the scope of Congressional authority to 
regulate the economy.  Ackerman argues that these are not different events but related 
because they are examples of constitutional politics which is the sine qua non of 
successful constitutional change:
Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the name of the People, a 
movement’s political partisans must first, convince an extraordinary number of 
their fellow citizens to take their proposed initiative with a seriousness that they 
do not normally accord to politics; second, they must allow their opponents a fair 
opportunity to organize their own forces; third, they must convince a majority of 
their fellow Americans to support their initiative as its merits are discussed, time 
and again, in the deliberative fora provided for in ‘higher lawmaking.’77
Successful constitutional foundings and transformations, in short, rest on a bed of 
democratic politics.
The realist account rests on a very different understanding of the democratic 
beliefs and practices that sustain American constitutionalism than does the conventional 
account.  Constitutionalism does not require an exceptional culture that lacks serious 
disagreement as Louis Hartz argued but rather a shared belief that individuals can
77 Id. at 6.
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disagree profoundly while agreeing that their disputes will be settled by a set of ground 
rules that can be changed over time.  American democracy manages to combine deep 
ideological divisions with a shared commitment to a set of constitutional ground rules.78
It is easier, after all to agree on procedures to settle disputes than it is to agree on values.
The most important procedure that has been agreed upon is that the constitution should be 
difficult to change.  Constitutional changes do not always occur by formal amendment 
but do involve a high level of social mobilization.79 Constitutional politics differs from 
ordinary politics because of the degree of mobilization that is required for change to be 
effectuated.  In short, the support the constitution enjoys is evidenced by the political 
mechanisms through which the United States Constitution has changed over time.  
Moving courts away from the center of the constitutional universe has important 
implications for developing nations.  The conventional account paints a bleak picture for 
whether constitutions can limit power in developing nations because it assumes that 
democracies evolve over a very long time span and that without shared values, 
constitutions are unlikely to work.  The realist account, on the other hand, suggests that 
constitutionalism may work in a number of different settings, even in nations with deep 
ideological divisions and without a long tradition of democratic governance, as long as 
citizens become attached to institutions.  The American constitution became entrenched 
not because it is a clever engineering feat or because courts maintain the boundary 
between law and politics but because vibrant political practices sustain and nourish the 
78 John Ferejohn et al., Editor’s Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE, 
supra note __ , at 1-8; Finn, supra note __, at 54-60; and James T. Kloppenburg, In 
Retrospect: Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America, 29 REV. IN AM. HIST. 460, 
466 (2001).
79 FOUNDATIONS, supra note __.
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formal provisions of the constitution.80 The key to making democracy work, therefore, 
lies in nurturing the political practices by which institutions gain social support.81
The experience of Latin America teaches us, however, that simply adopting a 
constitution—no matter how well crafted—does not ensure that the political practices 
needed for constitutions to limit political power will emerge.  American constitutionalism 
rests on the shared understanding that constitutional change requires a high degree of 
consensus.  Latin American constitutionalism, on the other hand, rests on a very different 
understanding which is that constitutions should be malleable and as readily changed as 
ordinary legislation.  Latin America provides a mirror through which we can see a 
parallel constitutional universe that has important similarities and differences to our own.  
Once institutions are invented, they can be copied by other polities but they are 
transformed in the process.82  Part III traces the path of constitutionalism in Latin 
America to examine the consequences of fusing constitutional politics with ordinary 
politics that occurs when constitutions are not entrenched.
80
 George Reid Andrews & Herrick Chapman eds., The Social Construction of 
Democracy, 1870-1990: an Introduction in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY, 
1870-1990, at 1 (1995); FOUNDATIONS, supra note __; and Llewellyn, supra note __.
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 Charles Tilly, Democracy is a Lake, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
DEMOCRACY, 1870-1990, at 365 (George Reid Andrews & Herrick Chapman eds., 1995) 
and James Johnson, Inventing Constitutional Traditions: the Poverty of Fatalism, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE, supra note __, at 71, 93.
82 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN 
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III. The Path of Constitutionalism 
in Latin America
There is nothing more difficult to carry through than initiating changes in a state’s 
constitution.  The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the 
old order and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would 
prosper under the new.  Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their 
adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because men are 
generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested 
them by experience.83
Machiavelli’s insight into the political difficulties facing the founding of new 
constitutions suggests that Latin America’s experience following independence is the 
norm whereas the United States’ experience is the exception.84  Independence in Latin 
America was followed by unrelieved civil war for almost half a century throughout most 
of the continent85 whereas the United States enjoyed a series of peaceful presidential 
transitions throughout its history and did not face a civil war until the middle of the 
nineteenth century.  From the early days of the Republic, the constitution was an 
important locus of power as the Supreme Court of the United States creatively used the 
power of judicial review to enhance national power.86  There was political conflict but 
there was also a shared understanding that those conflicts would play out under the rules 
83 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 51 (George Anthony Bull trans., Penguin 
Books 1981) (1532).
84
 The uncertainty generated by constitutional change and the political violence 
that may follow in the wake of such change is nicely illustrated by current events in the 
Middle East, particularly in Iraq.  Steven R. Weisman, The Great Middle East Shake-Up, 
N.Y. TIMES,  Jan. 30, 2005, sec. 4, at 1.
85
 The classic account of nineteenth Latin American history is DAVID BUSHNELL 
& NEILL MACAULEY, THE EMERGENCE OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(1994).  
86 MCCLOSKEY, supra note __.
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provided by the constitution.87  In Latin America, on the other hand, constitutions were 
not the source of power.  Rather caudillos or strong leaders with a basis of popular 
support provided the glue that held the newly independent nations of the region 
together.88  In short, law mattered in determining political outcomes in the United States 
in a manner that was not the case in Latin America.  
Constitutions as well as the laws more generally took a different path in Latin 
America than they did in the United States.  The different path that the law took in Latin 
America provides us with a window that can be used to explore the puzzling relationship 
between law and the larger political, social, economic, and cultural structures in which 
law operates.  The framers of Latin America’s constitutions and drafters of her civil 
codes borrowed from the United States and Europe.89  Scholars are divided on why the 
87
 The one notable exception was the American Civil War which demonstrates 
that constitutions cannot regulate all political conflicts.  The constitutional claim of the 
secessionists was based on popular sovereignty which can be “profoundly disruptive of 
the constitutional order.”  Keith Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2093, 2124 (2001).
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 The best study is JOHN LYNCH, CAUDILLOS IN SPANISH AMERICA, 1800-1850
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NAPOLEONICO Y SU RECEPCION EN AMERICA LATINA (1997).
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constitutions that were adopted in the wake of independence failed to regulate political 
life in any meaningful sense.  One view among scholars is that Latin America’s 
constitutions did not work well because they were borrowed and failed to fit the social, 
political, economic, and cultural realities of the region.90  According to this view, the 
constitutions of the region were adopted with the intent of instituting liberalism but failed 
to do so because of the marked social inequality in the region, the control that the 
colonial state exercised over the economy, and the lack of experience with self-
government.  The opposing view is that constitutions were not adopted to institute 
liberalism but were simply facades for dictatorship.91  That is, independence was simply a 
power grab by local elites who sought to maintain the old order by using liberal 
constitutions to mask their true intentions. Both views are united, however, in the belief 
that the explanation for the course of constitutionalism in Latin America lies not in 
human agency or constitutional design but rather in how the environment of the region
modified or trumped the constitutions and laws that were adopted.  This scholarly debate, 
which is discussed in Part III(A) infra, rests on the assumption that law is shaped by its 
environment and consequently laws that are foreign to a particular environment will fail 
to take root and flourish.
There is little doubt that the environment in Latin America was not as conducive 
to liberalism as the environment in the United States.  Liberal constitutions in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were revolutionary.  These constitutions marked a 
90 Rosenn, supra note __.
91
 Glen Dealy, Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition, 48 
HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 37 (1968); CLAUDIO VÉLIZ, THE CENTRALIST TRADITION IN LATIN 
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turning point from the ancient regime of monarchical governments, hierarchical societies, 
and mercantilist economies to a new world of republican governments, egalitarian 
societies, and free markets.  Spain was more successful than England in transplanting the 
foundations of the ancient regime to the New World.92  Spain yoked the conquistador and 
the friar to build a socio-legal environment where status was the key to power.93  As a 
consequence, a “neomedieval civilization” consisting of the “minorities of the State, 
Church, and landed entrepreneurs, aided and abetted by a small but influential group of 
merchants and entrepreneurs chiefly engaged in the extractive industries, collaborated to 
preserve a fixed and constant order in a world of accelerating change.”94  In short, the 
inability of liberal constitutions to transform Latin American provides a strong argument 
for the importance of environmental factors in determining whether borrowed laws 
succeed or fail.  
Yet it would be a mistake to conclude, as does the scholarly debate concerning 
why constitutions failed to implement republican government discussed in Part III(A) 
infra, that the environment is the sole factor we must take into account in explaining 
Latin American constitutionalism and that constitutional politics played no role in 
shaping the region’s political culture.  Spain’s success in fashioning a New World in its 
image cannot explain the remarkable persistence of an environment that is inimical to
92 MARK A. BURKHOLDER & LYMAN L. JOHNSON, COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA
(1998); COLONIAL LEGACIES: THE PROBLEM OF PERSISTENCE IN LATIN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (Jeremy Adelman ed., 1999)[hereinafter COLONIAL LEGACIES]; COLONIAL 
SPANISH AMERICA (Leslie Bethell ed., 1987); and JAMES LOCKHART & STUART B. 
SCHWARTZ, EARLY LATIN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA AND 
BRAZIL (1983).
93 LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF 
AMERICA 173-178 (1963).
94 LEONARD, supra note __.
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liberalism.95  Monarchy has been replaced by elected presidents who act more like 
elected despots than leaders bound by constitutions.96  Free markets have proven difficult 
to implement.97  Social and economic inequality remains pervasive.98  An environment 
does not endure for over two centuries without being watered by human agency.  In short, 
the constitutional politics of Latin America, which is discussed in Part III(B) infra, has 
played as important a role in shaping the environment of the region as has Spain’s legacy.  
The framers of Latin America’s constitutions and law understood that 
environmental factors were not conducive to the implementation of liberal constitutions.  
Simon Bolívar, for example, argued in his Discourse at the Congress of Angostura that 
95
 The persistence of political, social, and economic structures is remarkable even 
if the nature of these continuities and the reasons for them are a matter of dispute.  
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laws should be suited to the people for whom they are made; that it would be a 
major coincidence if those of one nation could be adapted to another; that laws 
must take into account the physical conditions of the country, climate, character 
of the land, location, size, and mode of living of the people; that they should be in 
keeping with the degree of liberty that the Constitution can sanction respecting the 
religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, resources, numbers, commerce, 
habits, and customs.  This is the code we must consult, not the code of 
Washington!99
Part III(B) discusses how a desire among the elites to develop and transform the region 
which they believed to be backward100 led to the adoption of constitutions and laws that 
provided significant power to the central state.101  The cure for underdevelopment was 
oligarchy and dictatorship today, a more inclusive republican government tomorrow.  
Law in Latin America did not take a failed path, 102 but, as this Article argues, a different 
path which comported not only with the legacy of Spain but also the manner in which 
constitutions and the laws more generally were constructed in the region.
99 SELECTED WRITINGS OF BOLÍVAR 179-80(Harold Bierck, Jr., ed., Lewis 
Bertrand trans., 1951).  The writings of many political actors in the region illustrate a fine 
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A. The scholarly debate
Until the third wave of democracy, Latin America provided a paradox: 
constitutions throughout the region guaranteed democracy103 yet dictatorship or oligarchy 
was the political reality.  One possible answer to this paradox is to concede that although 
liberal ideals have not been fully implemented, they remain a “permanent aspiration.”104
The issue then becomes why liberal aspirations failed to become political reality.  
Professor Keith Rosenn seeks to answer this question in The Success of 
Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin America: an 
Explanation.105  He provides a fine summary of the principal factors that might explain 
why Latin America experienced oligarchy and dictatorship whereas the United States 
enjoyed democracy.  He argues that three factors principally explain these differences.  
First, the colonists in the United States had considerable experience with self-government 
whereas the colonists in Latin America lacked such experience.  Spain gave little power 
of self-government to its colonies and chose to staff its bureaucracy with Spanish born 
officials rather than those with roots in the colonies.  Second, the United States 
constitution was an “original creation, specially tailored to fit the fundamental values of 
American society,”106 whereas Latin America’s constitutions “reflect inherent tensions 
between fundamentally conflicting traditions that continue to exist in Latin American 
society” between an “imported” liberal tradition and the native authoritarian and 
103
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corporatist Hispanic tradition.107  This problem was compounded by a very different legal 
tradition.  Common law judges, unlike civil law ones, had the freedom and independence 
to creatively construe the United States constitution.108  Thirdly, the United States 
experienced a social revolution that led to equality following independence whereas Latin 
America did not.  The creole elite engineered independence to gain power not to 
restructure society and the “wealth, power, and privileges of the aristocracy have 
persisted since independence.”109  In short, constitutions in Latin America sought to 
effectuate republican government but failed to do so because they were planted in an 
environment that was inimical to liberalism.
Another possible answer to this paradox is to conclude that Latin America failed
to implement liberalism because that was not the goal of independence.110  The 
constitutions of the region were not a failed attempt to establish republican government 
but a successful attempt to preserve Hispanic absolutism using liberal forms.111  There 
was little experience with or faith in using institutions to check power which is why 
“power was . . . vested in one body.”112  Rather than the liberal tradition argues the 
historian Claudio Véliz, Latin America is the heir of the centralist tradition.113  The 
political regimes of the region, whether on the left or right, are bureaucratic and highly 
107
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centralized.114  The revolutionary wave that swept the North Atlantic world in the late 
eighteenth century failed to change this tradition.  As a consequence of this deep-rooted 
political tradition, Latin America has achieved “electoral democracy but not . . . liberal 
democracy.”115
The problem with the scholarly analysis of why Latin America failed to achieve 
republican government is that it focuses on the environment in which constitutions were 
planted while de-emphasizing the role of human agency in constructing that environment.  
There is little doubt that the distance between the ideals imbued in these foundational 
documents and the political, social, and economic reality of the region helps explain why 
the transplant of republican government did not thrive in the region.  Yet it is a mistake to 
ignore the role played by the liberal constitutions and laws that were adopted in the wake 
of independence.116  Law played an important role in shaping the political culture of the 
region in two important respects.  First, the framers of the region’s constitutions 
understood the social problems of the region and were clearly worried about the 
possibility of civil unrest.  To deal with this problem, they designed constitutions that 
placed too much power in one central figure, namely the president.117  The idea was to 
centralize power to facilitate economic development so that liberalism could be 
effectuated later when development had transformed the conditions of the region.  One 
consequence of this degree of centralization was that laws became mutable which 
facilitated elite control but meant that no one could trust having someone else run the 
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government.  Excessive presidential power led to greater not less unrest, however, as the 
transition from a government of men to one of laws became impossible.  Second, the 
linkages between constitutions and the people which are necessary if constitutions are to 
effectively cabin political power could not be created in such an environment.  The
people had little trust in constitutions that could be changed so readily.  Without popular 
support, constitutions could not provide the institutional matrix needed for political 
accommodations to be reached.  To understand these consequences, however, we need to 
understand the historical process by which the legal culture of the region was fashioned.
B. The historical path of the law in Latin America
The excessive concentration of political power that led to law being subordinated 
to politics did not begin, however, after the conquest of Spanish America by the 
Hapsburg monarchs in the sixteenth century as the scholarly debate concerning the failure 
of constitutions in the region to institute liberalism assumes118 but during the 1750s when 
power was centralized by the Bourbon monarchs who succeeded the Hapsburgs to the 
Spanish throne in an attempt to facilitate economic development.  When the Spaniards 
under the Hapsburg monarchs erected the colonial state on the ruins of indigenous 
civilizations, they created a remarkably flexible and stable political system in which law 
was an important part of the glue that held the largest empire that the world had ever seen 
118
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together.119  The legitimacy of the system can be measured by the simple fact that no 
army was required to hold the Hapsburg empire together.120
The Hapsburgs governed through the Council of the Indies which employed a 
procedure that though cumbersome ensured that all interested parties had a chance to 
participate and that decisions were made strategically, “with an eye toward the 
anticipated reaction.”121  Strategic behavior was facilitated at the local level by the 
principle that officials could selectively ignore royal edicts that would cause too much 
damage to local interests and by having the jurisdiction of those officials overlap so that 
ambition could check ambition.122  Spanish colonial administration was a “government of 
judges, where nearly every appointed official exercised some sort of judicial authority. . . 
. The legal system served as a constant venue of negotiation between distinct groups and 
individuals who comprised this hierarchical society.”123
The accommodations facilitated by the formal elements of Hapsburg governance 
rested on an informal alliance, based on ties of kinship and interest, between local elites 
119
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and royal bureaucrats.  These ties made it difficult for the Crown to pursue policies that 
conflicted with the oligarchy’s wishes.  When the Bourbons came to power in 1713, they 
inherited a “system that might best be described as self-rule at the king’s command.”124
The complex series of compromises on which the legitimacy of Hapsburg rule rested 
were viewed by the Bourbons as corrupt and as preventing the reforms needed to quicken 
economic growth both in Spain and the colonies.  The intelligently inefficient, redundant, 
and legalistic Hapsburg system was overhauled by the introduction of intendants whose 
jurisdiction was clearly demarcated so that jurisdictional conflict did not impede royal 
desires.  Revenue collection was enhanced by appointing a salaried fiscal bureaucracy 
and a military was built up to fend off foreign incursions.  The Bourbon reforms resulted 
in an “administrative revolution” which “created a new absolutist state, based . . . on a 
standing army and a professional bureaucracy.”125  The pronounced centralism that 
characterized the Latin American state until the 1980s began, therefore, with the Bourbon 
reforms.  
Colonial governance was toppled by the revolutionary wave that swept through 
the Atlantic world at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
centuries.126  Monarchies were replaced by republics while a legal system based on status 
in which rights were determined by one’s place in society gave way to a legal system in 
which citizens enjoyed equal rights and contract, not status, organized society.  Law, not 
status, would henceforth determine rights.  
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Latin America, however, did not fully participate in this revolutionary wave.  
Spanish America adopted constitutions and civil codes but these new institutions did not 
transform society.  Law regulated neither public nor private behavior because formal 
rights were trumped by social norms.  Monarchy was replaced by republican government 
but contract did not replace status and it was status that determined where power lay.  
The legal foundations of the post-independence state were subordinated to the social 
bonds between powerful families which were the real basis of power.127  Latin America 
remained a clientelistic, patrimonial society in which status determined which rights one 
enjoyed.
The reason that independence did not result in revolutionary transformations lies 
in the ambivalence that Creole elites had towards liberalism.  They looked favorably on 
being able to control their own economic destiny but had deep-rooted fears of 
empowering the masses.  It is no accident that those nations where the lower classes
posed the greatest threat to the upper class, such as Peru and Mexico, were the last to 
achieve independence whereas independence on the periphery of the Spanish empire, 
where the indigenous population was smaller, was achieved with less effort.128  Latin 
American independence did not come about so much as the result of the revolutionary 
wave that swept the North Atlantic world but as a result of the power vacuum created by 
the forced abdication of the Spanish monarchy and the unhappiness of the Creole elites 
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with the Bourbon reforms.129  The masses were mobilized to fight for independence, but 
Latin American elites, unlike their counterparts in the United States, crafted institutions 
that precluded citizen rights from being realized.  
The twin legal pillars of the nineteenth century—liberal constitutions and civil 
codes—masked how power was exercised.  Suffrage was generally limited to free men 
with property and the military, which had grown in size during the wars of independence, 
was used to protect against internal unrest.  Elections were rigged and strong leaders, 
whose power rested on personal bonds with their followers, were the true source of 
power.  As Halperín-Donghi observes, “Among the many ways of overthrowing the 
government practiced in post-revolutionary Spanish America, defeat at the polls was 
conspicuously absent.”130  Stability, when it was achieved, did not rest on impersonal 
constitutions, but on pacts which bound the real actors that exercised power in a polity.131
Caudillos, not constitutions, provided order by relying on personal loyalty, rather than 
law, to glue society together.132
The quickening of economic growth in the late nineteenth century strengthened 
the power of this small elite as it manipulated legal institutions to retain the benefits of 
growth.133  Throughout Latin America, land tenure laws were changed to weaken 
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corporate, that is Indian and religious, ownership of land and labor laws, such as debt 
peonage and vagrancy laws, were used to force those who had been dispossessed of their
land to work on large commercial estates.134  Power was centralized in the hands of the 
few and the legal system, therefore, was not afforded the power to accommodate disputes 
between different interest groups.  As a result, the legal system was marginalized from 
the process of nation building.135
The economic growth that occurred under liberal regimes in late nineteenth 
century Latin America led to their demise as new social groups, such as a middle class 
and industrial workers, emerged and sought political representation. 136  Liberal regimes 
were replaced by corporatist regimes in the twentieth century which sought to provide 
some representation to these new social groups while controlling the demands they could 
articulate.  Government grew in size and complexity as more services were provided to 
newly mobilized social groups but these services were selectively applied to enhance 
centralized control.137  Constitutions, beginning with Mexico’s in 1917, were also 
transformed since individual rights, which had formally been paramount in the liberal 
constitutions of the nineteenth century, were subordinated to social rights.  Social 
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guarantees increased in quantity and complexity which added to the length of the typical 
Latin American constitution.138
The tendency towards greater executive authority was a global one in the wake of 
the depression: the “power of presidents, prime ministers, and dictators expanded as 
central governments became managers of vast bureaucratic organizations aimed at 
providing welfare and promoting economic development.”139  The oligarchic state was 
replaced by a “modernizing” state which increasingly turned to bureaucratic control of 
virtually all aspects of the economy as a means of achieving development.  The state 
sought to promote industrialization by selecting imports on which to raise tariffs, by 
manipulating exchange rates to selectively aid local industry, by providing capital for 
certain industries, and by manipulating labor.  
Although the intent of these policies, known as import-substitution 
industrialization, was to promote development, the unintended but principal consequence 
was to deepen the entanglement of states and elites.140 The adoption of import-
substitution industrialization deepened the intertwining of state and elites by increasing 
the range of activities over which the state could extend privileges to those with 
connections.141 Politics became a zero sum game in which elites competed to obtain 
privileges from the state.  The result was a society in which businesses competed in the 
political arena for favors rather than competed in the market.  Laws flowed out of the 
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state at a prodigious rate as elites competed for privileges.142  In short, the rise of the 
corporatist state in the twentieth century, which was a logical response to demands for 
economic development, strengthened elite power. 
Since the bureaucracy was the locus of power which settled economic disputes, 
there was no need for an impartial judiciary to settle disputes between private litigants.143
Instead the judiciary became a rich source of patronage for the executive.144 Those who 
were unable to compete for bureaucratic privileges, the poor, were forced into the 
informal or “black” sector of the economy.  The rural poor sought a better life by 
migrating in large numbers to the cities in the twentieth century throughout Latin 
America.145  They found a legal system hostile to their interests and, as a result, were 
forced to build homes on land they did not own and engage in a variety of trades for 
which they lacked proper legal authorization.146
The shantytowns that rim Latin America’s cities and the chaotic nature of much 
of the traffic and trade in her cities are a direct consequence of this failure of law.  The 
poor choose to invest less in their homes and businesses than they would have if the law 
protected their property.147  Without a means of protecting contractual rights, the poor 
choose to buy from those they know rather than engage in arms length transactions.  They 
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are also unable to grow their businesses since more complex forms of business 
enterprises, such as partnership and corporation, require access to a legal system.  
Without a system of tort law, accident rates increase since there is no legally imposed 
financial incentive to use care when engaged in business or daily activities.
The collapse of the overly centralized Latin American state in the 1980s was 
caused by its inability to provide the sorts of public goods that citizens demand of 
government.  This failure is intimately connected to the deficient Latin American 
institutional environment which failed to facilitate the sort of cooperative behavior 
needed to make government work.  As a consequence of the failure of the developmental 
state, the policy prescriptions that have been advocated to implement development 
changed dramatically in the 1980s.  Latin America has moved from the model of a strong 
government that uses the law to command that certain changes be made to promote 
development to a model in which leaders are elected, power is decentralized, and law 
facilitates the sort of activities—economic, social, and political—needed to promote 
development.  
One of the important lessons to be learned from the role of law in Latin America 
is that closed political systems can be buttressed by relatively “open” legal structures that 
facilitate the accommodation of various interests whereas ostensibly pluralistic political 
systems can be undermined by elitist legal structures.  The colonial state was able to 
endure without relying on a military because law under the Hapsburgs allowed 
individuals to reach accommodations.  The various authoritarian regimes that populated 
independent Latin America, on the other hand, failed to provide legal systems that 
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accommodated different interests.148  None of the institutions of these authoritarian 
regimes worked as one might expect.  Militaries were designed to maintain internal order 
rather than provide defense from external enemies, constitutions legitimated 
dictatorship,149 and the judiciary was designed to maintain control over marginalized 
sectors of the populace rather than settle disputes.
Today’s current batch of democracies, therefore, “enjoy” an authoritarian legality 
that is a legacy of policies designed to achieve development that began with the Bourbons 
and continued up through the 1980s.150  Democratic consolidation requires a transition 
from this deep-rooted authoritarian legality to a more democratic legality.  Democratic 
legal systems differ from authoritarian ones in that the rules facilitate cooperative 
behavior rather than mistrust.  De Soto argues persuasively:
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We have spoken of good laws and bad laws, a good law being one that guarantees 
and facilitates the efficiency of the economic and social activities it regulates and 
a bad law, one that disrupts or totally prevents it. . . . 
[Good laws] must facilitate the specialization and interdependence of individuals 
and resources. . . .
However, this specialization of individuals and resources cannot take place if 
individuals are isolated and do not trust one another. . . . There can be no denying 
that the law and the institutions safeguarding it are the principal source of this 
trust.151
Understanding the process by which “good” laws emerge requires that we 
examine the puzzle of institutional emergence.  Institutions are not static.  Authoritarian 
regimes become democratic more readily than bad laws become good because there are 
significantly less institutions to change.  Only a handful of key players need to agree to 
make the initial transition to democracy whereas legal institutions are so diffused 
throughout society that the masses as well as elites must be engaged for law to be 
transformed.  Democratic consolidation, unlike democratic transition, requires an 
attitudinal shift in the citizenry.  The answer to the puzzle of institutional emergence lies 
in examining why some institutions fail and why others succeed.  The next section takes 
up this issue by looking at why constitutionalism failed to change the status quo in Latin 
America but not in the United States.  
151 DE SOTO, supra note __, at 182-83.
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IV. A Tale of Two Constitutions
‘In Peru, we have very good laws, but one is missing: a law that says that all the 
other laws should be complied with.’ Nicolás de Piérola, President of Peru, 1895-
1899152
Although constitutions are designed to regulate government, nations with similar 
constitutions have governments that can and do behave differently.  The nations of Latin 
America adopted constitutions that formally looked like that of the United States,153 but 
Latin America’s constitutions facilitated authoritarianism whereas the constitution of the 
United States helped consolidate democracy.  These different outcomes rest on how 
constitutions were socially constructed.  Constitutional politics in the United States is
democratic because it rests on citizen mobilization and involvement in constitutional 
152
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change.154 Governments and elites pay attention to the rules of the game because they 
understand that the citizens might mobilize on behalf of the rules.155 As a consequence, 
the constitution was able to serve as the backdrop to a series of negotiations and 
compromises that allowed the constitution to change slowly over time.  Constitutional 
politics in Latin America, on the other hand, led to a divorce between the citizenry and 
formal constitutional rules of the game.156 The decision to centralize power and make 
rules malleable to promote development enhanced elite power but at the expense of 
citizen allegiance to the fundamental rules of the game. There was little reason for 
citizens to mobilize on behalf of rules that could be readily changed by those in power.157
As a consequence, peaceful negotiations and compromises proved difficult and the 
solution to many political disputes became the golpe de estado.
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constitutions are varied.  In Mexico, one political party controlled all three branches of 
government which allowed it to change the constitution almost at will.  When President 
Zedillo, for example, sought to amend the constitution to strengthen the Mexican 
Supreme Court by proposing a number of fundamental changes, his proposals were 
ratified in less than one month!  Jorge A. Vargas, supra note 10.  In Argentina, it was 
customary for each new president to pack that nation’s Supreme Court with his cronies.  
Carlos S. Nino, On the Exercise of Judicial Review in Argentina, in TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 309 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 
1993).
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The issue is how Latin America might start on the road towards a more 
democratic constitutional politics by making the difficult transition from a government of 
men to one of laws. One appealing answer to this issue is that what is defective are the 
institutions that Latin America adopted and that the solution lies in adopting better 
ground rules.  A number of scholars have become busy in the wake of the third wave of 
democratization writing and arguing about how to better design the bits and pieces of 
democracy in Latin America—the executive,158 the judiciary,159 the legislature,160 and 
158
 The prevalence of dictatorship in the region led scholars to argue that 
reforming the executive is the key to improving democratic prospects in the region.  Juan 
Linz touched off an important scholarly debate by arguing that presidential democracy 
was the root cause of dictatorship in the region and parliamentary government was 
superior in making democracy endure for the long haul.  JUAN J. LINZ & ARTURO 
VALENZUELA, THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (1994).  Others have 
questioned whether parliamentary government is superior to presidential government and 
concluded that presidential government with a more constrained executive than has been 
the norm in Latin America is the best form of governance for the region.  
PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note __.  See generally Bruce A. Ackerman,
The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000).  
159
 The marginalization of laws and judges from the process of nation building in 
the region led many scholars to explore and question the efficacy of the various judicial 
and legal reforms that have occurred in the region.  See, e.g., HAMMERGREN, supra note 
__; THE (UN)RULE OF LAW, supra note __; W ILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, supra note __; and 
MARK UNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN 
AMERICA (2002).
160 LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Scott Morgenstern & Benito Nacif 
eds., 2002) and LEGISLATURES AND THE NEW DEMOCRACIES IN LATIN AMERICA (David 
Close ed., 1995).
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state and local government161—to provide the sort of pay-off to the citizenry that is 
needed if democracy is to endure.  
The problem with engineering solutions is that if the history of constitutional 
politics in Latin America teaches us anything, it is that tinkering with constitutions alone 
cannot construct democracy.  The history of the region is littered by reforms that failed 
because they did not transform local power structures.162 As Professor Thome notes, how 
reforms play out depends on a “hard-to-unravel socio-legal tapestry.”163 The operation of 
rules is mediated by the environment in which they are placed and which those rules also 
help create.  Liberal constitutions in the nineteenth century were not simply trumped by a 
hostile environment but paradoxically played an important role in creating the very 
environment that set Latin America on a different path than the United States. 164
Another appealing but very different answer to the problem of why Latin 
American constitutional politics took a different path than the United States contends that 
engineering solutions are unimportant since the key to understanding the efficacy of 
161
 The pronounced centralism that has characterized Latin American politics 
since the 1750s led many scholars to emphasize the importance of decentralization in 
enhancing democratic governance in the region.  See, e.g., TIM CAMPBELL, THE QUIET 
REVOLUTION: DECENTRALIZATION AND THE RISE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN LATIN 
AMERICAN CITIES (2003); DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 
(Alfred P. Montero & David J. Samuels eds., 2004); FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN 
LATIN AMERICA (Edward L. Gibson ed., 2004); R. ANDREW NICKSON, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1995) and GEORGE E. PETERSON, DECENTRALIZATION 
IN LATIN AMERICA: LEARNING THROUGH EXPERIENCE (1997).  A very fine study 
exploring how decentralization may have a positive impact on democratic functioning is 
JUDITH TENDLER, GOOD GOVERNMENT IN THE TROPICS (1997).
162 YVES DELEZAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE 
WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN 
STATES 246-50 (2002).
163 Thome, supra, note __, at 693.
164 See Part III(B) supra.
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constitutional rules lies in the attitudes of the citizens towards those rules.  Professor 
Putnam argues that legal reforms are not the key to making democracy work since such 
reforms cannot transform deeply entrenched attitudes.165 Rather it is the habits and mores 
of the citizenry that explain why some parts of the world are authoritarian and others 
democratic.  No doubt a civic culture is important in sustaining democracy much as the 
lack of such a culture facilitates authoritarianism.166 The problem with contending that 
the nature of civil society is the sole determinant of the efficacy of legal reform167 is the 
making of new constitutions—as well as the amending and maintenance of 
constitutions—sometimes succeeds in creating the societal attitudes needed for 
constitutions to become entrenched.168
This Article argues that to understand how constitutions may become entrenched, 
we need to steer a path between the Scylla that better laws can transform society and the 
165 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN 
MODERN ITALY (1993).
166 CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E. 
Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000).
167 Oddly one potential solution to the problem of transforming Latin America’s 
constitutional politics by means of transforming the attitudes of the citizens has been tried 
and found wanting.  Domingo Sarmiento who was the president of Argentina from 1868
to 1874 argued that it was the mentality of the common folk of Argentina that prevented 
development and what was needed was immigration by Europeans to cure the nation’s 
ills.  SARMIENTO, supra note __.  Sarmiento’s views were shared by many elites in 
Argentina and as a consequence a constitutional environment was built in nineteenth 
century Argentina that was designed , in part, to promote immigration.  Miller, supra note 
__.  Immigrants came in unprecedented numbers with undoubtedly different attitudes
than the native inhabitants.  This immigration did not secure democracy for Argentina, 
however, but contributed to the demise of Argentina’s political order which was unable to 
build a national identity in the face of this massive wave of immigration.  GINO GERMANI, 
POLITICA Y SOCIEDAD EN UNA EPOCA DE TRANSICION: DE LA SOCIEDAD TRADICIONAL A 
LA SOCIEDAD DE MASAS (1965).
168 TEITEL, supra note __, at 191-207 (arguing that constitutions in transitional 
democracies are not only based on the past but also seek to change the future).
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Charybdis that societal attitudes determine the success or failure of legal reforms.  The
new constitutionalism in Latin America—the reforms currently being undertaken to 
effectuate democracy—will suffer the same fate as the old—the liberal constitutions 
adopted in the nineteenth century—unless we understand how the transition from a 
government of men to one of laws may occur.169 To understand how Latin America 
might begin on the path of a more democratic constitutional politics, we need to unravel
the legal and social tapestry of Latin American constitutionalism.  First, we need to 
understand why it has proven so difficult to entrench constitutions in Latin America.  Part 
IV(A) infra argues that though the conditions that led to the adoption of malleable 
constitutions no longer exist, those rules created an environment which makes reform 
difficult.  The diffuse interest that citizens have in entrenching constitutions is trumped 
by the more intense preferences that political and social elites have in perpetuating the 
status quo.  Simply because constitutional entrenchment is desirable does not mean that 
reform will occur.  Institutional arrangements may be normatively irrational but socially 
rational.  Second, we need to understand the processes by which the logic of Latin 
American constitutionalism might be transformed.  Part IV(B) infra explores how social 
movements sometimes succeed in transforming the logic of constitutional politics so that 
governments and elites pay greater attention towards rules.  Social movements that 
succeed in entrenching constitutional rules do so by deepening the diffuse interest that 
169
 A number of scholars are pessimistic about the possibility of constitutional and 
legal reform in the region given the failure of past reform efforts.  See, e.g., Jeremy 
Adelman & Miguel Angel Centeno, Between Liberalism and Neoliberalism: Law’s 
Dilemma in Latin America, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, 
AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW ORTHODOXY 139 (Yves Delezay & Bryant Garth eds., 2002) 
and DELEZAY & GARTH, supra note __.  This Article argues, however, that reforms that 
are based on a transformation of societal attitudes are possible.  See Part IV(B) infra.  
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citizens have in protecting their rights into more deeply held preferences.  Revolutions 
that succeed do so by creating broad and deep support for rights.
A. The logic of constitutionalism without constitutional entrenchment
There is a long and rich scholarly tradition of ignoring constitutions in explaining 
Latin American politics.170 Given the obvious gap between written constitutions 
proclaiming limited government and individual rights and the reality of regimes that 
respect few limits on power, it is frequently and mistakenly argued that constitutions are 
meaningless abstractions in Latin America.171 Although formal constitutions do not 
provide an accurate map of political power, this does not mean that political behavior 
does not respond to norms.  Professor O’Donnell argues persuasively that the reason 
formal rules failed to limit political power is that they were “trumped” by informal ones 
and that the proper inquiry, therefore, is to determine what the informal rules of political 
behavior are.172
170
 Many scholars argued that prevalence of authoritarian government and 
economic underdevelopment could best be explained by Latin America’s structural 
connection to capitalism.  That is, polities on the “periphery” of global trade were fated to 
remain poor and provide raw materials for wealthier nations such as the United States and 
Western Europe which were at the center of the world economy.  FERNANDO HENRIQUE 
CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
(Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans., 1979); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF CHILE AND BRAZIL
(1967); and STANLEY J. STEIN & BARBARA H. STEIN, THE COLONIAL HERITAGE OF LATIN 
AMERICA: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA (1970).  This school 
of thought known as dependency has fallen out of favor because it cannot explain why 
the region has democratized.  Democratization has led to a new interest in the study of 
institutions.  Karen L. Remmer, Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: the 
Resurgence of Institutional Analysis, 50 WORLD POL. 34 (1997).  
171 See Dealy, supra note __; VÉLIZ, supra note __; and WIARDA, supra note __.
172
 Guillermo O’Donnell, Illusions about Consolidation, in COUNTERPOINTS, 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION 175 (1999). 
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To understand how these informal rules arose and why they have persisted, we 
need to understand the notion of path dependency.  In Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics, Professor Roe explains path dependency with a metaphor.173  Imagine that 
when a path was originally laid out, the road builders feared dangerous animals that lived 
in the forest.  The path meandered to avoid this danger.  Over time, towns and cities grew 
up along this path.  Although over time it became clear that a straight path would lower 
transportation costs, it is very difficult politically to create a consensus on changing the 
path because those who live along the crooked path would suffer from the loss of traffic 
that would result from any improvements.  That is to say, institutions that were rational 
when initially designed persist even though they are no longer desirable because the 
political calculus shifted in a manner that favors the suboptimal status quo.  Path 
dependency, in short, explains why institutions that do not work well are very difficult to 
change because they enjoy considerable political support.
Latin America’s constitutions bear important birth marks that have proven very 
resilient.  The dangerous animals that Latin America’s constitution writers feared were 
the lower classes.  Inequality made the masses potentially dangerous to the elites.  Thus, 
constitutions were drafted that allocated significant power to the executive to deal with 
emergencies with the hope that development would one day make republican governance 
possible.174 Latin America’s constitutions are, therefore, strongly presidentialist.  
Legislation typically originates with the president either through his formal decree power 
173
 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641 (1996).
174 See Part III(B) infra.
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or his control over the legislature.175  Virtually all the constitutions of the region 
authorize elected leaders to declare states of siege in an emergency.176 These provisions 
have provided the “juridical foundation of dictatorship and tyranny.”177 In short, as 
Professor O’Donnell argues, Latin America does not have constitutional or dualist 
democracy but a form of monist democracy which he calls delegative democracy because 
it rests “on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to 
govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations 
and by a constitutionally limited term of office.”178
The decision in the nineteenth century by the framers of Latin America’s 
constitutions to allocate excessive power to presidents had two very important but
unintended consequences.  First, constitutionalism in Latin America shortened the time 
lines of political actors making it difficult to reach the sort of accommodations needed to 
solve pressing social problems.  Given the malleability of rules, presidents quite naturally
fear coups and unrest.  As a consequence, presidents frequently choose policies that 
strengthen their hold on power by placing cronies in political power over policies that 
175
 Garro, supra note __; Hartlyn & Valenzuela, supra note __; PRESIDENTIALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note __; and DE SOTO, supra note __.
176
__ Negretto & __ Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin 
America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1797 (2000) and LOVEMAN, supra note __.
177 Id. at 373.
178
 Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 56, 59 (1994).
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might have a pay-off in the future.179 The excessive power given presidents also means 
that they fear the election of opponents with markedly different views and are quite 
willing to bend rules to prevent such a result from occurring.180  Democracy in Latin 
America combines the worst elements of authoritarianism and democracy as presidents 
have nearly the powers of a despot but must use that power to shore up their political 
support at the expense of policies that have a long term pay-off.  Building the 
179 BARBARA GEDDES, POLITICIAN’S DILEMMA: BUILDING STATE CAPACITY IN 
LATIN AMERICA (1994).  Professor Geddes argues that the short time lines of presidents 
presents them with the dilemma of choosing between policies that enhance their grip on 
power and policies that help build the nation.  As an example of this dilemma, she notes 
that former President Allende of Chile had to decide whether to staff Chile’s copper 
mines with political cronies who were incompetent managers or with professionals who 
had the technical expertise to run the mines.  Allende was a socialist whose presidency 
occasioned severe turmoil in Chile.  Although the long-term success of the mines was 
critical to Allende, he chose to reward his political supporters in managing the mines.  Id. 
at 17.  President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela recently made a similar decision to staff 
state run oil companies with political cronies who have little expertise in the oil business.  
__ N.Y. TIMES __.
Another example of a president choosing to shore up support over building 
institutions that would strengthen governance is former President Menem’s decision to 
place political cronies on Argentina’s Supreme Court.  The court rubber stamped 
Menem’s policies but the cost was high as the court understandably lost legitimacy.  
Larkin, supra note 14.
180
 President Vicente Fox, for example, was embroiled in a political dispute 
intended to prevent the leftist, popular mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador, from becoming president in Mexico’s upcoming presidential elections.  Charges 
were brought that the mayor’s administration did not respect a judicial order regarding 
construction that the city was undertaken and which could have prevented the mayor 
from running for the presidency.  James C. McKinley, Jr., The Explosive Mix in Mexico’s 
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2005, at A4.  The calculation in bringing these charges 
what that it would serve the short-term interests of President Fox’s party if the mayor 
cannot run for the presidency.  The cost would long-term as any election without the 
participation of the popular Obrador would lose legitimacy.  There was considerable 
public opposition to the charges, however, which has led President Fox to drop the 
charges and it is now quite possible that Obrador will become the next president of 
Mexico.  Ginger Thompson, Pursuer of Mexican Leader’s Opponent Quits Under Fire, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2005, at __ and Ginger Thompson, With His Star Rising, Mexican 
Populist Faces New Tests, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2005, at A1.
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infrastructure needed to create a system of checks and balances, however, requires a 
long-term perspective that can only be provided by effectuating reasonably firm 
constitutional principles.
Second, although constitutions are designed to be difficult to change, the reality is 
that strong leaders have been able to change them easily.181 The constitutions of the 
region have been, behaviorally speaking, flexible rather than rigid.  Rigid constitutions 
preserve the fundamental rules of the games from the workings of ordinary politics 
whereas flexible constitutions are no more difficult to change than is ordinary 
legislation.182 Flexible constitutions facilitate minority power over majorities by 
allowing those in power to rewrite the fundamental rules of the game in their favor.183
Rules that are readily changed at the behest of those in power facilitate elite power but 
come at a high cost which is that elites and the masses lose trust in the rules under which 
they are formally governed.  One consequence of this lack of trust in constitutional rules 
is that political accommodations in the region typically come in the form of pacts or deals 
that bind the individuals who made them184 but pacts, unlike constitutions, are not inter-
generational deals.  Pacts work if the parties who made them trust each other but 
181
 President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, for example, was able to circumvent the 
limitations of Venezuela’s 1958 constitution by convening a constitutional convention 
and having a new constitution drafted that solidified his grip on power.  See McCoy, 
supra note __.  Another less dramatic but equally effective means to transform 
constitutional rules is by replacing the membership of a nation’s Supreme Court with the 
president’s cronies.  
182 BARENDT, supra note __, at 8.
183 AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND 
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 218-23 (1999).
184
 Guerra, supra note __, and Terry Lynn Karl, Dilemmas of Democratization in 
Latin America, in DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: PATTERNS AND CYCLES 21 (Roderic 
Ai Camp ed., 1996).
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constitutions require something more which is a trust in the “’power of words engrossed 
on parchment to keep government in order.’”185
In short, the drafters of Latin America’s constitutions sought to centralize power 
in the hands of the president in an attempt to steer a path between tyranny and anarchy.  
The paradox of Latin American constitutionalism is that it perpetuated the very ills that it 
sought to avoid.  Elite mistrust of the masses and the desire to foment development led to 
the over-centralization of power in the hope that authoritarianism today would lead to 
republican government tomorrow.  As a consequence constitutions lack the social 
moorings they need if they are to serve as an effective counterweight to political power.  
The construction of the institutional infrastructure needed to cabin political power and 
effectuate republican government, however, is impossible without constitutional rules 
that are beyond the reach of ordinary politics. One of the lessons of Latin American 
constitutionalism is that long-term political stability is impossible without entrenched 
constitutional rules.186 Constitutionalism without constitutional entrenchment leads to 
instability and crises.187
185
 Kay, supra note __.
186
 The contemporary experience of Mexico illustrates this principle.  Mexico was 
“exceptional” among the world’s dictatorships because it lasted longer than any other 
dictatorship in the twentieth century.  It was, as Mario Vargas Llosas said, the perfect 
dictatorship.  Cite.  The reason for Mexico’s success is that some important constitutional 
rules, such as the principle that no president could be re-elected, were respected.
MORRIS, supra note __.
187
 Whittington, supra note __, at 2109 (observing that a crisis of “constitutional 
fidelity” occurs “when important political actors threaten to become no longer willing to 
abide by existing constitutional arrangements.”)
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B. The social construction of constitutional entrenchment
Polities do manage to entrench constitutional rules.  The leading account of how 
this occurs stresses the importance of elite pacts.188  Professors North and Weingast note
that any bargain may fall apart because the incentives for complying with the deal are 
different than those in making the deal in the first place.189  Constitutions work when they 
are “self-enforcing” so that the “major parties to the bargain” have an “incentive to abide 
by the bargain after it is made.”190  Constitutional bargains stick when elites realize that it 
is in their self-interest to cede power to constitutions and to the laws more generally by 
making a “credible commitment” that they will abide by those rules.191 When other 
actors trust that these commitments will be kept, then the co-operation needed to ensure 
political stability may occur.
The problem with the elite-centered account of constitutional entrenchment is that 
it ignores the role of the people in making the commitments contained in constitutions 
188
 The issue of constitutional entrenchment is analytically distinct from that of 
constitutional or institutional emergence.  The scholarship on institutional emergence also 
stresses the role of elites but disagrees on the long-term implications that elite led 
changes have for democratic governance.  Compare MERILEE S. GRINDLE, AUDACIOUS 
REFORMS: INSTITUTIONAL INVENTION AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000) 
(claiming that elite consensus led to political decentralization in Argentina, Venezuela, 
and Bolivia and that such reforms might improve democratic governance) with Ran 
Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 71, 72 (2004) (arguing that the worldwide expansion of judicial power is a 
“product of the strategic interplay among hegemonic yet threatened political elites” and 
that this expansion of judicial power is troubling because it is a veiled “attempt to 
insulate policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics.”) 
189 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: the 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, in
THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 16 (Paul W. Drake & Matthew D. McCubbins eds., 1998)[hereinafter THE 
ORIGINS OF LIBERTY]. 
190 Id. at 19.  
191 Id. at 39.  
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credible.192  A core argument of this Article is that constitutions cannot be entrenched 
without citizen attachment to constitutional rules.  As Professor Whittington notes: 
[C]onstitutions attempt to regulate the government itself and cannot rely on any 
external enforcement mechanisms. . . . [T]he primary sanction available for a 
constitutional violation is simply publicity of the violation, which centrally 
depends for its effectiveness on the continued general commitment to the 
constitutional provisions that are being violated.193
Elite pacts may bring stability for the generation that made the deal in question but the 
constitutional enterprise aims at creating a community “that can survive the corrupting 
influences of time and fortune.”194 In short, credible constitutional commitments must
not only be politically constructed by the elite bargaining that typically underpins the 
formal making of constitutions195 but must be also socially constructed by, as de 
Tocqueville noted, by the subterranean process in which the “T]he spirit of the law . . .  
192
 The elite centered account of how constitutions become entrenched bears 
obvious similarities to the leading account of how democracy emerges.  Professor Dahl 
has argued that stable democracies emerge when elites first learn how to play by a more 
democratic set of rules before participation is extended to the masses.  ROBERT A. DAHL, 
POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971).  See also Larry Diamond et al.,
supra note __, at 13-15 (arguing that Dahl’s thesis is borne out by the experience of Latin 
America’s more successful democracies) and Paul W. Drake & Mathew D. McCubbins, 
The Origins of Liberty, in THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY, supra note __, at 12 (claiming that 
liberty emerges from the calculus of self-interested sovereigns rather than from pressure 
from the grass roots).  Consolidated democracies emerge in two transitions: the first is the 
transition to democracy from authoritarianism, the second is longer and more difficult 
and involves building the institutions needed to limit political power.  The elite consensus 
that lies at the root of the initial transition to democracy, however, is insufficient to 
institutionalize the habits and mores of democracy needed for democratic consolidation.  
The experience of Latin America conclusively establishes that consolidation requires 
fundamental ground rules with deep social moorings.
193
 Whittington, supra note __, at 2110.
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 Finn, supra note __, at 42.
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 Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 
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gradually penetrates . . . into the bosom of society . . . so that at last the whole people 
contract the habits and tastes of the judicial magistrate.”196
The differing constitutional fates of Argentina and the United States demonstrate
that a constitution that is simply politically constructed by an elite pact cannot stand the 
test of time whereas one that is socially constructed may indeed endure.  Argentina 
experienced a period of sharp political conflict in the aftermath of independence in 
1810197 that ended when a dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, obtained sufficient power to 
impose order.  He rejected the necessity of a constitution198 and relied on a police force 
and the personal allegiance of his followers, who benefited from his governance, to 
maintain power from 1829 until 1852.199 Rosas was overthrown by forces that sought to 
impose a constitutional order that would provide the basis for economic growth in 
Argentina.200 Argentina’s economic growth had been stymied by its unstable institutional 
environment.  Argentina had land in abundance but could not attract either the 
196
 De Tocqueville, supra note __.
197
 The constitutional struggle that led to civil war in the aftermath of 
independence was motivated principally by the differing economic interests of political 
actors located in different regions of Argentina.  TULIO HALPERÍN DONGHI, POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY IN ARGENTINA IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (Richard 
Southern trans., 1975) and MIRON BURGIN, THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ARGENTINE 
FEDERALISM, 1820-1852 (1946).
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 Letter from Juan Manual de Rosas to Don Juan Facundo Quiroga (Dec. 20, 
1834), supra note __.
199 JOHN LYNCH, ARGENTINE DICTATOR: JUAN MANUAL DE ROSAS 1829-1852
(1981).  Rosas was an able and brutal dictator who, rather oddly, called himself the 
“Restorer of the Laws.”  Rosas believed that he was restoring an older Hispanic order that 
had been rent by liberal ideals.  He had no patience for laws in any formal sense, 
however, and personally reviewed the sentences handed down by his courts to determine 
which of his enemies should be put to death and which ones exiled.  Id.
200 JEREMY ADELMAN, REPUBLIC OF CAPITAL: BUENOS AIRES AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ATLANTIC World (1999) and Lynch, supra note __.
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immigrants or the capital it needed to make the land productive when it was rent by civil 
war or governed by a dictator who used force to govern.  
Professor Miller argues persuasively that the decision to adopt a constitution in 
1853 modeled after that of the United States led to political stability and provided the 
institutional underpinnings for Argentina’s phenomenal growth in the late nineteenth 
century.201 Most scholars, as Professor Miller notes, ignore the importance of the 1853 
constitution because it failed to implement political democracy or indeed many of the 
provisions of the constitutional text.202 Political rights remained uncertain since elections 
were rigged and there were numerous rebellions.  Professor Miller concludes that 
Argentine constitutionalism was an
enormous success, however, in terms of what its designers wished to 
accomplish—to encourage immigration and to stimulate economic growth.  It was 
also successful in establishing a system of mutual security under which the 
political opposition, even in the absence of democratic elections, knew that it 
would suffer only limited oppression, and where the party in power knew that 
even if the opposition came to power, it would not do them serious harm.203
The 1853 constitution was, however, only an elite bargain as evidenced by the 
failure to implement many of its provisions and by the lack of public deliberation that 
accompanied its adoption.204  The sort of electoral fraud regularly practiced under the
1853 constitution could not occur under a constitution with deeper social moorings.  The 
real source of power during this period was the acuerdo or informal agreements between 
political elites.205  This result was foreseen by the framers of the 1853 constitution who 
201
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believed that civil society was a threat to order and that the “republican state should be
autonomous from civil society as a whole.”206
The political order created in 1853 broke down in the early twentieth century 
under the weight of massive immigration and the inability of the Argentine state to find a 
means to incorporate these new citizens into the political system.207 The constitutional 
system created in 1853 was unable to change to deal with these social transformations 
because the formal rules of the game lacked social moorings.  The lack of support for the 
1853 constitution is evidenced by the course of Argentina’s twentieth century political 
history.  When the military overthrew a popularly elected president in 1930, the citizens 
did not rise up to protest the overthrow of the constitution.  For the next fifty years, 
Argentine politics oscillated between dictatorship and democracy.  Without a separation 
between ordinary and constitutional politics, the changes needed to deal with the social 
transformations caused by immigration were not possible within the framework of the 
1853 constitution.
The failure of Argentina’s 1853 settlement illustrates that elite pacts cannot 
withstand the test of time that is the acid test of successful constitutions.  Argentina’s 
constitution lacked social moorings because it aimed only at ending political disputes 
between elites but failed to sweep away the authoritarian social and political order that
Argentina inherited from Spain.  The American revolution, on the other hand, provides an 
example of how a constitution can obtain deep social moorings by sweeping away an 
authoritarian legal and social order.  Colonial North American did not differ as much 
206 ADELMAN, supra note __, at 195.
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from Latin America as is commonly believed.208  The British colonies were ruled by a 
monarchy and society was hierarchical and clientelistic.  Patronage was the glue that held 
this society together because it provided a link between inferiors and superiors in which 
resources were exchanged for loyalty.209  Law “reinforced dependencies of all sorts” 
since more than “half of the people in most of the settlements were legally unfree in some 
way—dependent on fathers or husbands, masters or landlords.”210
The disintegration of this inegalitarian, monarchical society was necessary for 
republicanism to succeed.  Professor Wood argues that the American revolution was the 
most radical in history if measured by the “degree of social transformation that 
occurred.”211  Wood concludes:
The revolutionaries aimed at nothing less than a reconstitution of American 
society.  They hoped to destroy the bonds holding together the older monarchical 
society—kinship, patriarchy, and patronage—and to put in their place new social 
bonds of love, respect, and consent.  They sought to construct a society and 
government based on virtue and disinterested public leadership and to set in 
motion a moral movement that would eventually be felt around the globe.212
The key to the long-term success of the American revolution was that it facilitated 
a peculiar form of politics by entrenching the constitution.  Subsequent constitutional 
change was possible only if supported by a large majority of the citizenry.  Such changes 
helped deepen citizen attachment to the constitution since they are directly involved in 
constitutional transformations.  The social movements generated by constitutional 
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struggles play a “jurisgenerative role,” as Professor Siegal notes, by ultimately deepening 
citizen attachment to the constitution.213  Higher lawmaking forces citizens to take part in 
constitutional change which plays an important role in connecting civil society to the 
state.214 Even the losers stay in the constitutional game because they can turn to 
“constitutional and higher-law arguments to articulate their deeply felt demands.”215
Constitutional politics within a framework of a constitution that has deep social 
moorings may not only deepen citizen attachment to the constitution but can also help
solve the problem of the non-enforcement of constitutional provisions.  Constitutional 
rules are sometimes trumped by social norms in the United States no less than in Latin 
America.  The Reconstruction amendments that promised political equality to the freed 
slave were ignored for a century because of the intense desire of Southern whites to 
maintain an egalitarian social structure.216 Ordinary politics in a democracy cannot solve 
collective action problems where there is broad but diffuse support for a certain outcome 
and narrow but intense support for a very different outcome.217  Constitutional politics 
that rest on social movements, on the other hand, can operationalize non-enforced 
constitutional norms by transforming societal attitudes.  The best example of how this 
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may occur lies in the complex relationship between Brown v. Board of Education218 and 
the civil rights revolution.  Professor Klarman argues that Brown did little directly to
desegregate Southern schools directly as little changed in the South in the decade 
following the decision.219 Brown facilitated the realization of the promise of equality 
embedded in the Reconstruction amendments by “invigorating a civil rights 
movement.”220  The civil rights movement, in turn, led to massive and violent resistance 
in the South that transformed the diffuse support in the North for the political goal of 
equality to a more intense support.  This change in intensity of preference in the North 
was critical to the enactment of the important legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.221 Brown is, as Professor Powe notes,222 ultimately a majoritarian decision but it is 
a peculiar one in that it helped fashion the very majority that provided the decision with 
the support it needed to be effectuated.
The reason that Latin America has not undergone similar constitutional 
transformations is clearly not for want of social movements but rather because the 
conditions that made possible the separation of constitutional from ordinary politics in the 
United States did not occur in Latin America until the recent wave of democratization 
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that began in the 1980s.223  The profound social inequality that marks the region led elites 
to opt for a peculiar form of liberalism that excluded the masses from power.  
Constitutions became flexible, behaviorally speaking, to facilitate elite power but the cost 
was that they lacked broad citizen support.  As a consequence the social movements that 
arose were typically revolutionary since there was no possibility of transforming the 
system without an armed struggle.224  These social movements were similar to social 
movements in the United States, however, inasmuch as they sought to transform the 
obvious diffuse base of support for change into more intense preferences that were 
needed if a revolution were to succeed.  The twentieth century witnessed a long struggle 
between a revolutionary left and conservative elements made up of elites and the military 
supported by the United States.  
The end of the Cold War transformed Latin American politics as conservative 
elements gave up their iron grip on power and the left moved from revolution to political 
and grass roots organization.  The end of revolutionary struggle also led the United States 
to abandon its support for dictatorship in the region.  The combination of poverty and 
inequality has led to the triumph of the political left throughout most of the region.225
The social construction of constitutionalism in the region is now possible as the political 
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system has become responsive to societal pressure.226 Grass roots movements in the 
region have led to a transformation of the public sphere as new linkages are being created 
between informal democratic practices and the institutions of governance.227
In short, it is not a law requiring that all the other laws be respected that Latin 
America needs for constitutionalism to work, even if that has been the hope of Latin 
American reformers from Simon Bolívar to President Hugo Chávez.  What Latin
America needs to make the transition from authoritarian to democratic legality is not 
more “good” laws imposed from above but social movements from below that press 
governments to respect rights.  Social movements form to demand change when 
governments are not responsive to citizen demands.228  Individual rights lie at the basis of 
social movements229 because they provide a “trump” card against government action.  
Social movements seek to have rights embedded in constitutions and other laws because 
the law dramatically lowers the cost of having rights enforced.  Rights that require the 
mobilization of social movements to effectuate are difficult to exercise whereas rights 
that are protected by the government can be realized without the necessity of collective 
action.  Successful social movements close the gap between the rhetoric of a legal order 
and the behavior of political actors.  When a desire to have the fundamental rules of the 
game respected permeates society, rulers have an incentive to respect those rules. The 
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fidelity to rules which democratic consolidation requires can be created in the very 
process of effectuating those rights.  
V. Conclusion
Mirrors symbolize reality, the sun, the earth and its four corners, its surface, its 
depths, and all of its peoples. . . . Is not the mirror both a reflection of reality and a 
projection of the imagination?230
Comparative constitutionalism clearly broadens and deepens our understanding of 
constitutional law.231  It also forces us to think about the linkages between constitutional 
law and the larger social world within which it is embedded.  Professor Scheppele writes 
“The urgent issue in constitutional studies typically is to know whether the experiences of 
some constitutional settings are helpful for understanding others.”232  The key to making 
a claim that the experience of one nation might help another is not to focus on specific 
laws but rather to understand the “logics of particular contexts as a way of illuminating 
complex interrelationships among political, legal, historical, social, economic, and 
cultural elements.”233 Examining constitutionalism through the looking glass of Latin 
America allows us to unravel the linkages between constitutions and society.  
This Article explores a deceptively simple question: why did constitutionalism in 
Latin America take a different path than in the United States?  Constitutions were 
adopted throughout the New World in the wake of independence movements in the late 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to effectuate republican government.  Yet 
constitutionalism in Latin America led to dictatorship whereas constitutionalism in the 
United States led to republican government.  The conventional answer to this issue is that 
the constitution was entrenched in the United States because law is independent from 
politics,234 whereas constitutions are not entrenched in Latin America because politics 
trump constitutions.235 The problem with this view is that it conflates the end of a long 
historical process with the process itself.  Presidents in the United States today must 
respect court orders.  There is little doubt, however, that has not always been the case.  
Justice Marshall strained to avoid a dispute with President Jefferson to hand over the 
commission sought by William Marbury because the Supreme Court of 1802 lacked the 
authority to order a President to comply with its orders.236 Presidents in Latin America, 
on the other hand, currently enjoy a rich repertoire of mechanisms they can use to 
circumvent constitutional restraints.237 The issue facing new democracies in Latin 
America and throughout the world is not whether constitutions should be judicially 
enforced,238 but how do constitutions become entrenched against political inroads.  
The answer to that question requires that we peer through the looking glass of 
constitutional law to determine how constitutional norms are socially constructed so that 
elected leaders must respect them.  The devolution in power from political leaders to 
rules that is the key to consolidating democracy occurs when there is trust that the 
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constitution will maintain order.  The constitution became entrenched in the United States
not because law enjoys independence from politics but because constitutional politics is 
played under a different set of rules than is ordinary politics.239 The difficulty in 
amending the constitution does not flow from the provisions of Article V as the 
constitution has undergone important transformations outside the formal mechanisms of 
the constitution.  The constitution is difficult to transform because constitutional change 
requires debate and citizen mobilization.  
Constitutions in Latin America are also constantly being changed by a variety of 
mechanisms outside the formal amendment provisions embedded in the region’s 
constitutions.240  The difference, though, is that these changes do not rest on citizen 
mobilization but are a result of elites seeking to perpetuate their power.241
Constitutionalism in Latin America facilitated dictatorship not because constitutions are 
meaningless abstractions but because constitutional politics were played under a very 
different set of understandings than in the United States.  Elites, not citizens, dictated 
constitutional change and as a consequence constitutions became as easy to change as 
ordinary legislation.242 The differing founding experiences and subsequent constitutional 
fates of Latin America and the United States demonstrate that a constitution that is 
politically constructed by an elite pact without the support of the citizens cannot stand the 
test of time whereas one that is constructed with adequate social moorings may do so.  
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The answer to the issue that underpins this Article then is that how constitutions are 
socially constructed determines political outcomes such as dictatorship or democracy.243
Louis Hartz concluded his magisterial The Liberal Tradition in America by 
arguing that American democracy had little to teach the world because it was 
exceptional.244  Hartz was partially right.  The United States has little to teach the world 
when democracy is viewed as an export from the developed world to the underdeveloped 
world. Law reform in the developing world has rested for too long on exports from the 
developed world.  These borrowed laws have never quite worked in their new 
environment as they did in the old.  The paradigm that provides the intellectual 
underpinnings for the project of borrowing needs to be reversed if we are to understand 
constitutionalism.  Legal theory in the United States will be enriched if the attitude that 
the South must learn from the North is replaced by one that takes seriously the problems 
faced by the South in entrenching constitutions.245 The comparative constitutional law 
enterprise, in short, has much to teach the United States about what makes democracy 
work.
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